https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=141.101.69.165&feedformat=atomexplain xkcd - User contributions [en]2024-03-19T11:59:04ZUser contributionsMediaWiki 1.30.0https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=Talk:2340:_Cosmologist_Genres&diff=195902Talk:2340: Cosmologist Genres2020-08-11T10:09:47Z<p>141.101.69.165: </p>
<hr />
<div><!--Please sign your posts with ~~~~ and don't delete this text. New comments should be added at the bottom.--><br />
An ultra-early comic, after the prior quite-early one. Is Randall (suddenly now) getting enough sleep? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.71|162.158.154.71]] 08:31, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
:Perhaps his sleep schedule has become completely hopeless instead. [[Special:Contributions/108.162.238.37|108.162.238.37]] 11:08, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
:what do you mean ultra early?<br />
::(Remember to sign...) As a metric, look at the page-creation times of the last few comic pages (i.e. View History). The times, at least for me as an anon-IP with no settings changed, are that of the server's home, not Randall's, but consistent tor all that.<br />
::Quite often, the comic page is created shortly after midnight and the auto-filled date has to be corrected to the assumption it was published on the Mon/Wed/Fri by Randall, not the Tue/Thu/Sat of the server (which seems to check/listen for a new comic periodically, ready to create and pre-populate the page ASAP after it is commentable-about).<br />
::Wednesday (prior comic) was very much still within Wednesday, and this one was about ''twenty hours'' ahead of normal (4am, server's Friday, rather than midnight+ on server's Saturday). No sign yet of Monday, when I checked just now, so perhaps ⅔rds of last week was just a transient anomaly. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.71|162.158.154.71]] 13:27, 3 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
::Can we find a match between publication times and the 28-hour-week? [[Special:Contributions/141.101.69.165|141.101.69.165]] 10:09, 11 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
Is the 'pop' not considered a metal possibly referring to the 'pop test' for Hydrogen gas that I had to do hundreds of times in high school? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.2.230|162.158.2.230]] 10:13, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
Is "Lite" a play on "Light" - i.e. photons during the big bang?[[Special:Contributions/108.162.245.106|108.162.245.106]] 17:39, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
:Nope. (Probably not, anyway.)[[Special:Contributions/172.69.63.169|172.69.63.169]] 18:31, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
Why 'pop' is 'lite'?<br />
[[Special:Contributions/162.158.238.6|162.158.238.6]] 19:29, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
I'd say it's because pop is the most commonly played music genre, just as hydrogen and helium are the most common elements. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.93.109|162.158.93.109]] 20:35, 31 July 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
Surely Pop is 'Lite' because it refers to the Big Bang - or 'Big Pop' in this case. And it was all Hydrogen or helium at that moment therefore 'lite' not 'metal'. <br />
:I get why ''pop'' is lite, but why "Lite". Is that a collective term in cosmology for Hydrogen and Helium? [[User:Kapten-N|Kapten-N]] ([[User talk:Kapten-N|talk]]) 07:21, 3 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
I'd like to point out that astronomers don't always refer to non-H/He stuff as "metal". When you start talking about exoplanets, asteroids and meteoroids, there's a different classification (albeit nearly as reductive):<br />
<br />
*Gas: H<sub>2</sub> and He<br />
*Ice: anything made out of CHON<br />
*Rock: basically the ordinary meaning - mostly metal silicates and sulfides<br />
*Metal: native metals<br />
<br />
Each of these has much less variation in density and volatility than the variation between categories (I listed them in ascending order of density and descending order of volatility), so these tend to stick together both in terms of what stays on a planet and in terms of forming layers on a planet (e.g. Earth has no Gas, a light dusting of Ice in the form of the biosphere and oceans, Rock crust and mantle, and a Metal core; Neptune's outer layers are Gas, most of the planet is Ice, and the core is Rock and Metal). [[User:Magic9mushroom|Magic9mushroom]] ([[User talk:Magic9mushroom|talk]]) 05:57, 1 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
:That calls for a sequel involving both drugs and music. I don't see how to make sex fit. --[[Special:Contributions/172.69.69.110|172.69.69.110]] 08:47, 1 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
I assumed pop->bang->big bang->(let there be) lite<br />
[[User:Ysth|Ysth]] ([[User talk:Ysth|talk]]) 08:03, 3 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
This is most likely in reference of https://xkcd.com/2205 where approximation in cosmology is usually in orders of magnitude instead of precise value. In this case only "pop" music is lite and everything else is "metal" with nothing in between. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.45|162.158.62.45]] 15:57, 3 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
<br />
Fun fact (feel free to delete if not allowed): you can take any of the genres on the left and combine it with "metal" to get a subgenre of metal that actually exists!<br />
::"Metal Metal"??? (And remember to Sign, just for courtesy...). [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.131|162.158.154.131]] 19:21, 3 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
:::Not exactly, but quite close: https://nanowarofsteel.bandcamp.com/track/true-metal-of-steel [[User:Elektrizikekswerk|Elektrizikekswerk]] ([[User talk:Elektrizikekswerk|talk]]) 07:52, 5 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
::Wait, are there subgenres called "Latin Metal" and "Folk Metal"?[[Special:Contributions/172.69.63.79|172.69.63.79]] 18:56, 5 August 2020 (UTC)<br />
:::Why, sure. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_metal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folk_metal [[User:Elektrizikekswerk|Elektrizikekswerk]] ([[User talk:Elektrizikekswerk|talk]]) 07:58, 6 August 2020 (UTC)</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=Talk:1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=140564Talk:1844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T15:09:44Z<p>141.101.69.165: /* Consolidate Information */</p>
<hr />
<div><!--Please sign your posts with ~~~~--><br />
<br />
== Consolidate Information ==<br />
<br />
Looks like 2 of us added explanations at the same time. Someone else want to consolidate them and produce a concise explanation?<br />
<br />
~blackhat<br />
<br />
I tried merging our explanations, so there is a small improvement, but there is still some duplicated information. Plus I'm not a native english speaker, so a consolidation by a third editor would be welcome.</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=1405631844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T15:04:53Z<p>141.101.69.165: joke</p>
<hr />
<div>{{comic<br />
| number = 1844<br />
| date = May 31, 2017<br />
| title = Voting Systems<br />
| image = voting_systems.png<br />
| titletext = Kenneth Arrow hated me because the ordering of my preferences changes based on which voting systems have what level of support. But it tells me a lot about the people I'm going to be voting with!<br />
}}<br />
<br />
==Explanation==<br />
In this comic, Cueball, White-hat, and Ponytail are discussing voting systems. Cueball mentions three different types: approval voting, instant runoff, and condorcet voting.<br />
<br />
'''Approval voting:''' basic voting system in which a voter can select any number of candidates. Each candidate is treated as a separate question "Do you approve of this person winning, yes or no?" The candidate with the most votes wins. [http://electology.org/approval-voting See this for more info]<br />
<br />
'''Instant Runoff:''' Also known as Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), instant runoff voting simulates a series of elections until a single candidate holds more than 50% of the votes. Voters rank as many or all of the candidates on the ballot. In the first round, if no candidate has greater than 50% of the votes, the last place candidate is eliminated. If another election were held, voters who chose the eliminated candidate would vote for their second choice (ranked #2 on their ballots). In the simulated second round, that is exactly what is done. Their votes go to their second choice candidates. This process of eliminating the last place candidate and redistributing votes continues until there are two remaining candidates or a candidate has greater than 50% of the vote. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting Read more here]<br />
<br />
Condorcet Method: A Condorcet Method does not refer to a single voting method. It generally refers to a system that allows voters to rank candidates, but specifics may vary. It must fulfill the following requirement: a Condorcet winner is the candidate who would win the majority of the vote in each of the potential head-to-head elections against other candidates. [https://www.opavote.com/methods/condorcet-voting Read more here]<br />
<br />
This comic references three types of voting system:<br />
<br />
1) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting '''Approval Voting''']: Approval voting is a single-winner electoral system. Each voter may "approve" of (i.e., select) any number of candidates. The winner is the most-approved candidate.<br />
<br />
2) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting '''Instant-Runoff Voting''']: In Instant-Runoff Voting (also known as Ranked Choice or Preferential Voting) voters in elections can rank the candidates in order of preference. Ballots are initially counted for each elector's top choice. If a candidate secures more than half of these votes, that candidate wins. Otherwise, the candidate in last place is eliminated and removed from consideration. The top remaining choices on all the ballots are then counted again. This process repeats until one candidate is the top remaining choice of a majority of the voters.<br />
<br />
3) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method '''Condorcet Method''']: A '''Condorcet method''' is another single-winner electoral system that elects the candidate that would win a majority of the vote in all of the head-to-head elections against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property is called the Condorcet winner. Due to the Condorcet Paradox, there may not be a Condorcet winner in an election with 3 or more candidates.<br />
<br />
'''Arrow's impossibility theorem''' states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking. <br />
The theorem may be interpreted in a way suggesting that no matter what voting electoral system is implemented in a democracy, the resulting democratic choices are equally imperfect. <br />
<br />
As a simple illustration, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed left-to-right for each voter in decreasing order of preference):<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! Voter !! First preference !! Second preference !! Third preference<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 1 <br />
| A || B || C<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 2 <br />
| B || C || A<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 3 <br />
| C || A || B<br />
|}<br />
<br />
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a margin of two to one on each occasion. Thus the choice between A and C would not be the same whether the B choice is present or not. This example is referred to as '''Condorcet paradox'''.<br />
<br />
The joke in the comic is that often voters don't pick their favorite choice in a vote, because voting for their second or third favorite choice may prevent their least favorite choice from being selected.<br />
<br />
<br />
==Transcript==<br />
:[White Hat, Ponytail and Cueball are all standing. Cueball is talking.] <br />
<br />
:Cueball: I prefer approval voting, but if we're seriously considering instant runoff, then I'll argue for a Condorcet method instead.<br />
<br />
:[Caption beneath the panel:] <br />
:Strong Arrow's theorem: the people who find Arrow's theorem significant will never agree on anything anyway.<br />
<br />
<br />
{{comic discussion}}</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=1405611844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T14:59:40Z<p>141.101.69.165: solving editing conflict</p>
<hr />
<div>{{comic<br />
| number = 1844<br />
| date = May 31, 2017<br />
| title = Voting Systems<br />
| image = voting_systems.png<br />
| titletext = Kenneth Arrow hated me because the ordering of my preferences changes based on which voting systems have what level of support. But it tells me a lot about the people I'm going to be voting with!<br />
}}<br />
<br />
==Explanation==<br />
In this comic, Cueball, White-hat, and Ponytail are discussing voting systems. Cueball mentions three different types: approval voting, instant runoff, and condorcet voting.<br />
<br />
'''Approval voting:''' basic voting system in which a voter can select any number of candidates. Each candidate is treated as a separate question "Do you approve of this person winning, yes or no?" The candidate with the most votes wins. [http://electology.org/approval-voting See this for more info]<br />
<br />
'''Instant Runoff:''' Also known as Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), instant runoff voting simulates a series of elections until a single candidate holds more than 50% of the votes. Voters rank as many or all of the candidates on the ballot. In the first round, if no candidate has greater than 50% of the votes, the last place candidate is eliminated. If another election were held, voters who chose the eliminated candidate would vote for their second choice (ranked #2 on their ballots). In the simulated second round, that is exactly what is done. Their votes go to their second choice candidates. This process of eliminating the last place candidate and redistributing votes continues until there are two remaining candidates or a candidate has greater than 50% of the vote. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting Read more here]<br />
<br />
Condorcet Method: A Condorcet Method does not refer to a single voting method. It generally refers to a system that allows voters to rank candidates, but specifics may vary. It must fulfill the following requirement: a Condorcet winner is the candidate who would win the majority of the vote in each of the potential head-to-head elections against other candidates. [https://www.opavote.com/methods/condorcet-voting Read more here]<br />
<br />
This comic references three types of voting system:<br />
<br />
1) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting '''Approval Voting''']: Approval voting is a single-winner electoral system. Each voter may "approve" of (i.e., select) any number of candidates. The winner is the most-approved candidate.<br />
<br />
2) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting '''Instant-Runoff Voting''']: In Instant-Runoff Voting (also known as Ranked Choice or Preferential Voting) voters in elections can rank the candidates in order of preference. Ballots are initially counted for each elector's top choice. If a candidate secures more than half of these votes, that candidate wins. Otherwise, the candidate in last place is eliminated and removed from consideration. The top remaining choices on all the ballots are then counted again. This process repeats until one candidate is the top remaining choice of a majority of the voters.<br />
<br />
3) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method '''Condorcet Method''']: A '''Condorcet method''' is another single-winner electoral system that elects the candidate that would win a majority of the vote in all of the head-to-head elections against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property is called the Condorcet winner. Due to the Condorcet Paradox, there may not be a Condorcet winner in an election with 3 or more candidates.<br />
<br />
'''Arrow's impossibility theorem''' states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking. <br />
As a simple illustration, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed left-to-right for each voter in decreasing order of preference):<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! Voter !! First preference !! Second preference !! Third preference<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 1 <br />
| A || B || C<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 2 <br />
| B || C || A<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 3 <br />
| C || A || B<br />
|}<br />
<br />
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a margin of two to one on each occasion. Thus the choice between A and C would not be the same whether the B choice is present or not. This example is referred to as '''Condorcet paradox'''.<br />
<br />
The theorem may be interpreted in a way suggesting that no matter what voting electoral system is implemented in a democracy, the resulting democratic choices are equally imperfect.<br />
<br />
==Transcript==<br />
:[White Hat, Ponytail and Cueball are all standing. Cueball is talking.] <br />
<br />
:Cueball: I prefer approval voting, but if we're seriously considering instant runoff, then I'll argue for a Condorcet method instead.<br />
<br />
:[Caption beneath the panel:] <br />
:Strong Arrow's theorem: the people who find Arrow's theorem significant will never agree on anything anyway.<br />
<br />
<br />
{{comic discussion}}</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=1405591844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T14:57:05Z<p>141.101.69.165: /* Explanation */ electoral systems</p>
<hr />
<div>{{comic<br />
| number = 1844<br />
| date = May 31, 2017<br />
| title = Voting Systems<br />
| image = voting_systems.png<br />
| titletext = Kenneth Arrow hated me because the ordering of my preferences changes based on which voting systems have what level of support. But it tells me a lot about the people I'm going to be voting with!<br />
}}<br />
<br />
==Explanation==<br />
{{incomplete|Created by a BOT - Please change this comment when editing this page. Do NOT delete this tag too soon.}}<br />
<br />
This comic references three types of voting system:<br />
<br />
1) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting '''Approval Voting''']: Approval voting is a single-winner electoral system. Each voter may "approve" of (i.e., select) any number of candidates. The winner is the most-approved candidate.<br />
<br />
2) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting '''Instant-Runoff Voting''']: In Instant-Runoff Voting (also known as Ranked Choice or Preferential Voting) voters in elections can rank the candidates in order of preference. Ballots are initially counted for each elector's top choice. If a candidate secures more than half of these votes, that candidate wins. Otherwise, the candidate in last place is eliminated and removed from consideration. The top remaining choices on all the ballots are then counted again. This process repeats until one candidate is the top remaining choice of a majority of the voters.<br />
<br />
3) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method '''Condorcet Method''']: A Condorcet Method election is one that elects the candidate that would win a majority of the vote in all of the head-to-head elections against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate.<br />
<br />
'''Arrow's impossibility theorem''' states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking. <br />
As a simple illustration, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed left-to-right for each voter in decreasing order of preference):<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! Voter !! First preference !! Second preference !! Third preference<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 1 <br />
| A || B || C<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 2 <br />
| B || C || A<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 3 <br />
| C || A || B<br />
|}<br />
<br />
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a margin of two to one on each occasion. Thus the choice between A and C would not be the same whether the B choice is present or not. This example is referred to as '''Condorcet paradox'''.<br />
<br />
The theorem may be interpreted in a way suggesting that no matter what voting electoral system is implemented in a democracy, the resulting democratic choices are equally imperfect.<br />
<br />
'''Approval voting''' is a single-winner electoral system. Each voter may "approve" of (i.e., select) any number of candidates. The winner is the most-approved candidate.<br />
<br />
'''Instant-runoff voting''' is another single-winner electoral system. Instead of voting only for a single candidate, voters can rank the candidates in order of preference. Ballots are initially counted for each elector's top choice. If a candidate secures more than half of these votes, that candidate wins. Otherwise, the candidate in last place is eliminated and removed from consideration. The top remaining choices on all the ballots are then counted again. This process repeats until one candidate is the top remaining choice of a majority of the voters.<br />
<br />
A '''Condorcet method''' is another single-winner electoral system that elects the candidate that would win a majority of the vote in all of the head-to-head elections against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property is called the Condorcet winner. Due to the Condorcet Paradox, there may not be a Condorcet winner in an election with 3 or more candidates.<br />
<br />
==Transcript==<br />
:[White Hat, Ponytail and Cueball are all standing. Cueball is talking.] <br />
<br />
:Cueball: I prefer approval voting, but if we're seriously considering instant runoff, then I'll argue for a Condorcet method instead.<br />
<br />
:[Caption beneath the panel:] <br />
:Strong Arrow's theorem: the people who find Arrow's theorem significant will never agree on anything anyway.<br />
<br />
<br />
{{comic discussion}}</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=1405571844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T14:50:07Z<p>141.101.69.165: /* Explanation */</p>
<hr />
<div>{{comic<br />
| number = 1844<br />
| date = May 31, 2017<br />
| title = Voting Systems<br />
| image = voting_systems.png<br />
| titletext = Kenneth Arrow hated me because the ordering of my preferences changes based on which voting systems have what level of support. But it tells me a lot about the people I'm going to be voting with!<br />
}}<br />
<br />
==Explanation==<br />
{{incomplete|Created by a BOT - Please change this comment when editing this page. Do NOT delete this tag too soon.}}<br />
'''Arrow's impossibility theorem''' states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking. <br />
As a simple illustration, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed left-to-right for each voter in decreasing order of preference):<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! Voter !! First preference !! Second preference !! Third preference<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 1 <br />
| A || B || C<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 2 <br />
| B || C || A<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 3 <br />
| C || A || B<br />
|}<br />
<br />
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a margin of two to one on each occasion. Thus the choice between A and C would not be the same whether the B choice is present or not. This example is referred to as '''Condorcet paradox'''.<br />
<br />
The theorem may be interpreted in a way suggesting that no matter what voting electoral system is implemented in a democracy, the resulting democratic choices are equally imperfect.<br />
<br />
==Transcript==<br />
:[White Hat, Ponytail and Cueball are all standing. Cueball is talking.] <br />
<br />
:Cueball: I prefer approval voting, but if we're seriously considering instant runoff, then I'll argue for a Condorcet method instead.<br />
<br />
:[Caption beneath the panel:] <br />
:Strong Arrow's theorem: the people who find Arrow's theorem significant will never agree on anything anyway.<br />
<br />
<br />
{{comic discussion}}</div>141.101.69.165https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1844:_Voting_Systems&diff=1405561844: Voting Systems2017-05-31T14:46:41Z<p>141.101.69.165: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{comic<br />
| number = 1844<br />
| date = May 31, 2017<br />
| title = Voting Systems<br />
| image = voting_systems.png<br />
| titletext = Kenneth Arrow hated me because the ordering of my preferences changes based on which voting systems have what level of support. But it tells me a lot about the people I'm going to be voting with!<br />
}}<br />
<br />
==Explanation==<br />
{{incomplete|Created by a BOT - Please change this comment when editing this page. Do NOT delete this tag too soon.}}<br />
'''Arrow's impossibility theorem''' states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide ranking. <br />
As a simple illustration, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as follows (candidates being listed left-to-right for each voter in decreasing order of preference):<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! Voter !! First preference !! Second preference !! Third preference<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 1 <br />
| A || B || C<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 2 <br />
| B || C || A<br />
|- <br />
! Voter 3 <br />
| C || A || B<br />
|}<br />
<br />
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a margin of two to one on each occasion. Thus the choice between A and C would not be the same whether the B choice is present or not. This example is referred to as '''Condorcet paradox'''. <br />
<br />
<br />
==Transcript==<br />
:[White Hat, Ponytail and Cueball are all standing. Cueball is talking.] <br />
<br />
:Cueball: I prefer approval voting, but if we're seriously considering instant runoff, then I'll argue for a Condorcet method instead.<br />
<br />
:[Caption beneath the panel:] <br />
:Strong Arrow's theorem: the people who find Arrow's theorem significant will never agree on anything anyway.<br />
<br />
<br />
{{comic discussion}}</div>141.101.69.165