Talk:2030: Voting Software - Revision history

172.68.205.164 at 22:29, 11 April 2025

2025-04-11T22:29:14Z

Stardragon at 00:32, 27 March 2024

2024-03-27T00:32:04Z

172.70.90.29 at 13:57, 27 February 2024

2024-02-27T13:57:38Z

172.69.190.72 at 14:22, 22 November 2020

2020-11-22T14:22:00Z

Dgbrt: Please sign your comments.

2018-10-22T21:02:11Z

Please sign your comments.

141.101.76.82 at 19:53, 22 October 2018

2018-10-22T19:53:13Z

Sailorleo at 15:55, 27 August 2018

2018-08-27T15:55:12Z

172.69.55.190: deniability is both essential to voting and hard to implement electronically.

2018-08-14T11:38:27Z

deniability is both essential to voting and hard to implement electronically.

162.158.90.90 at 10:22, 13 August 2018

2018-08-13T10:22:55Z

172.68.59.24 at 14:41, 11 August 2018

2018-08-11T14:41:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:29, 11 April 2025
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	When paper votes need to be re-counted, it's easy: a vote is valid if there is a croos marking at exactly one candidate row. It's possible to implement this in software: store each "paper" as a separate file, and sing it with the voter's private key! Oh, wait, on real paper you don't add your signature because the vote is meant to be anonymous? Tough luck, as long as electronic votes are secret votes, there will be no way to make them re-countable reliably. {{unsigned ip\|141.101.76.82}}		When paper votes need to be re-counted, it's easy: a vote is valid if there is a croos marking at exactly one candidate row. It's possible to implement this in software: store each "paper" as a separate file, and sing it with the voter's private key! Oh, wait, on real paper you don't add your signature because the vote is meant to be anonymous? Tough luck, as long as electronic votes are secret votes, there will be no way to make them re-countable reliably. {{unsigned ip\|141.101.76.82}}
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		+	One proposed way of dealing with reasonable personally-authenticatable electronic voting (without losing the freedom to have a private vote of your own), is to allow everyone to 'unpack' their vote as many times as they want (ensuring that the system never wrongly assigned your choice, either accidentally or deliberately) to let you see what you ''had'' voted, but at the same time revoking it and requiring you to resubmit your choice (or, indeed, ''any'' choice, knowing that you would undo it again by the next check, so you could explore every single option to ensure that none of them come back 'wrong' in any way). In order to prevent vote-manipulation by intimidation, there'd be no 'post-election' check-back option, which means there must be a basic trust of what happens to the pool of unrescinded votes left over at the end of the process (when they are unpacked as a whole to go towards actually generating the electoral result), but you can at least do away with "I pressed A, but did it flash up B" (or, more insidiously, flashed up A but ''recorded'' B) issues. If you have any such impression, request your last vote be passed back to you and try again. And again. And again, as many times as you think is necessary to give you confidence. Then ''don't'' request it (only you know when that's going to be, so nobody's going to know that this is when they should kick in the miss-recording algorithm). Not that any of this needs Blockchain (just a nicely audited set of symmetric/assymetric salted-encryptions). I've forgotten what they call this method, otherwise I'd pass on a reference to the fuller description (that probably does better than me in outlining the process involved, from only half-remembered key details)... [[Special:Contributions/172.68.205.164\|172.68.205.164]] 22:29, 11 April 2025 (UTC)

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:32, 27 March 2024
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	Well the 'airplanes' part of this comic has aged really damn poorly :(		Well the 'airplanes' part of this comic has aged really damn poorly :(
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		+	:I mean, from what I've heard the problems are more with quality control at Boeing than the engineering itself [[User:Stardragon\|Stardragon]] ([[User talk:Stardragon\|talk]]) 00:32, 27 March 2024 (UTC)

	I think this comic is referencing [https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1026603800365330432 this twitter thread] and the controversy behind it.		I think this comic is referencing [https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1026603800365330432 this twitter thread] and the controversy behind it.

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 This comic is eerily relevant again these days!
 [[Special:Contributions/172.69.190.72|172.69.190.72]] 14:22, 22 November 2020 (UTC)
 I think this comic is referencing [https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1026603800365330432 this twitter thread] and the controversy behind it.

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 <!--Please sign your posts with ~~~~ and don't delete this text. New comments should be added at the bottom.-->
 I think this comic is referencing [https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1026603800365330432 this twitter thread] and the controversy behind it.
 [[Special:Contributions/172.69.190.4|172.69.190.4]] 17:59, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:02, 22 October 2018
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	::And anyway, you're describing more or less [https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Judge-Handbook/EJ_Handbook_P2018_ch7.pdf what already happens] in an election. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.58.11\|172.68.58.11]] 13:54, 11 August 2018 (UTC)		::And anyway, you're describing more or less [https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Judge-Handbook/EJ_Handbook_P2018_ch7.pdf what already happens] in an election. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.58.11\|172.68.58.11]] 13:54, 11 August 2018 (UTC)

−		+	When paper votes need to be re-counted, it's easy: a vote is valid if there is a croos marking at exactly one candidate row. It's possible to implement this in software: store each "paper" as a separate file, and sing it with the voter's private key! Oh, wait, on real paper you don't add your signature because the vote is meant to be anonymous? Tough luck, as long as electronic votes are secret votes, there will be no way to make them re-countable reliably. {{unsigned ip\|141.101.76.82}}
−	When paper votes need to be re-counted, it's easy: a vote is valid if there is a croos marking at exactly one candidate row. It's possible to implement this in software: store each "paper" as a separate file, and sing it with the voter's private key! Oh, wait, on real paper you don't add your signature because the vote is meant to be anonymous? Tough luck, as long as electronic votes are secret votes, there will be no way to make them re-countable reliably.

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:53, 22 October 2018
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	: Please sign your comments. The issue is a reduction of points of failure. In a paper ballot system, you have tens of thousands of humans being observed by each other and representatives of interested parties and judges doing the counting. A single malicious person would have to go to incredible effort to hide their miscountings, and then would only be able to change a hundred votes or so. In an electronic voting system, all it takes is one person to do an SD card swap and boom: tens of thousands of votes are changed. One person can change the code on the central counting system that reads the SD cards, and boom: millions of votes are changed. The fact that so much effort would be needed to change the result in a paper ballot system is a security feature. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231\|162.158.62.231]] 12:00, 11 August 2018 (UTC)		: Please sign your comments. The issue is a reduction of points of failure. In a paper ballot system, you have tens of thousands of humans being observed by each other and representatives of interested parties and judges doing the counting. A single malicious person would have to go to incredible effort to hide their miscountings, and then would only be able to change a hundred votes or so. In an electronic voting system, all it takes is one person to do an SD card swap and boom: tens of thousands of votes are changed. One person can change the code on the central counting system that reads the SD cards, and boom: millions of votes are changed. The fact that so much effort would be needed to change the result in a paper ballot system is a security feature. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231\|162.158.62.231]] 12:00, 11 August 2018 (UTC)
	::And anyway, you're describing more or less [https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Judge-Handbook/EJ_Handbook_P2018_ch7.pdf what already happens] in an election. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.58.11\|172.68.58.11]] 13:54, 11 August 2018 (UTC)		::And anyway, you're describing more or less [https://app.chicagoelections.com/documents/Judge-Handbook/EJ_Handbook_P2018_ch7.pdf what already happens] in an election. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.58.11\|172.68.58.11]] 13:54, 11 August 2018 (UTC)
		+
		+
		+	When paper votes need to be re-counted, it's easy: a vote is valid if there is a croos marking at exactly one candidate row. It's possible to implement this in software: store each "paper" as a separate file, and sing it with the voter's private key! Oh, wait, on real paper you don't add your signature because the vote is meant to be anonymous? Tough luck, as long as electronic votes are secret votes, there will be no way to make them re-countable reliably.

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 :That's simple, ideally it would be a private blockchain, and the evaluators would just be every voting computer in existence (They'd all be active for a similar fairly short time period). Presumably the evaluations would be ongoing during the voting process, then could be stopped once voting was complete. The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.74.225|162.158.74.225]]
 ::"The last few votes of the night may not wind up being evaluated" Thats horrifying. That alone should prove how terrible of an idea this is. [[Special:Contributions/162.158.154.181|162.158.154.181]] 17:14, 9 August 2018 (UTC)
 Wouldn't it be possible to run said blockchain on one's personal computer, instead of running on a voting machine? and you could compile open source software yourself to perform the voting. That sounds like a solid enough way to keep security fine to me, but if I'm missing something, please tell me. [[User:Gjgfuj|TheSandromatic]] ([[User talk:Gjgfuj|talk]]) 03:25, 9 August 2018 (UTC)

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 Carrying the SD cards to the central computer would still take time, but we're carrying much smaller things so it might speed up somewhat (less stuff to haul around), and the voting can be done nearly as fast as the central computer can read in the SD cards.
 No strange SD cards go into the central machine since they're carried by the same trustworthy human that counts the paper votes.
 What things will go wrong? Zillions, I'm sure. But what zillions? I'm curious!

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:22, 13 August 2018
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	What things will go wrong? Zillions, I'm sure. But what zillions? I'm curious!		What things will go wrong? Zillions, I'm sure. But what zillions? I'm curious!
		+	A modern processor can't run without it's own software layer. If you want to transfer the data - even if only from an SD card to a local hard drive - then you'd need about seven layers, from which many have sublayers. The lowest level, which is the hardware level, consists on another plethora of levels. If just one transistor is modified by an attacker - or the layout of the transistors or a part of the CPU or a part of the hdd-controller or a part of the SD card controller or... many other things. Then this could lead to the attacker modifying the result of the vote.
		+	There are thousands of attack points that start before the voting machine reaches it's target. Then there are attacking vectors that target the SD-card even before there's any voting data on it. (There are SD-card viruses that survive formatting and those aren't even on a hardware level) If you want a decently safe voting machine that costs less than a billion $ to make, then you should use a purely mechanical design. --[[Special:Contributions/162.158.90.90\|162.158.90.90]] 10:22, 13 August 2018 (UTC)

	You could all reference Brazil for how an electronic voting system works. It changed in the late 90s after a major country-wide voting fraud scandal that revealed that most of the vote counters in the whole country were unreliable, partisan, bribed or all three; to the point any recount would bring a vastly different result. The Brazilian public lost all faith in the paper ballots and the Federal Electoral Tribunal had to implement an electronic voting system to reacquire voter trust in the voting system.		You could all reference Brazil for how an electronic voting system works. It changed in the late 90s after a major country-wide voting fraud scandal that revealed that most of the vote counters in the whole country were unreliable, partisan, bribed or all three; to the point any recount would bring a vastly different result. The Brazilian public lost all faith in the paper ballots and the Federal Electoral Tribunal had to implement an electronic voting system to reacquire voter trust in the voting system.

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:41, 11 August 2018
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	A blockchain node doesn't technically need to be connected to the internet in order to function. It needs to have some method for receiving messages from other nodes on the blockchain network, and most blockchain nodes do indeed get these messages via the internet, but some magic beans nodes (for example) get updates about new blocks and new transactions from the Blockstream satellite. An internet connection is therefore not intrinsically necessary for a blockchain to work, it's just the most convenient way to do it.		A blockchain node doesn't technically need to be connected to the internet in order to function. It needs to have some method for receiving messages from other nodes on the blockchain network, and most blockchain nodes do indeed get these messages via the internet, but some magic beans nodes (for example) get updates about new blocks and new transactions from the Blockstream satellite. An internet connection is therefore not intrinsically necessary for a blockchain to work, it's just the most convenient way to do it.
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		+	:::: The blockstream satellite is an internet, just a different media. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.59.24\|172.68.59.24]] 14:41, 11 August 2018 (UTC)

	Do you think that this comic had anything to do with the debacle in Johnson County, KS last night? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231\|162.158.62.231]] 19:30, 8 August 2018 (UTC)		Do you think that this comic had anything to do with the debacle in Johnson County, KS last night? [[Special:Contributions/162.158.62.231\|162.158.62.231]] 19:30, 8 August 2018 (UTC)