Editing 2052: Stanislav Petrov Day
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On 26 September 1983, during the {{w|Cold War}}, the satellite-based early-warning system of the {{w|Soviet Union}} reported the launch of multiple {{w|Intercontinental ballistic missile|intercontinental ballistic missiles}} from the {{w|United States}}. At the time, tensions with the U.S. were on edge, and high officials of the Soviet Union, including General Secretary {{w|Yuri Andropov}}, were thought to be highly suspicious of a U.S. attack. | On 26 September 1983, during the {{w|Cold War}}, the satellite-based early-warning system of the {{w|Soviet Union}} reported the launch of multiple {{w|Intercontinental ballistic missile|intercontinental ballistic missiles}} from the {{w|United States}}. At the time, tensions with the U.S. were on edge, and high officials of the Soviet Union, including General Secretary {{w|Yuri Andropov}}, were thought to be highly suspicious of a U.S. attack. | ||
| β | Petrov checked ground-based radars which had not detected a launch, noted that the warning system had detected only 1-5 missiles instead of the hundreds that would have been expected in the event of a {{w|pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike}}, and chose to mark the system alert as a false alarm. This decision is seen as having prevented a retaliatory nuclear attack, which would have probably resulted in immediate escalation of the Cold War stalemate to a full-scale nuclear war and the deaths of hundreds of millions of people. Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had indeed malfunctioned. | + | Petrov checked ground-based radars which had not detected a launch, noted that the warning system had detected only 1-5 missiles instead of the hundreds that would have been expected in the event of a {{w|pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike}}, and chose to mark the system alert as a false alarm. This decision is seen as having prevented a retaliatory nuclear attack, which would have probably resulted in immediate escalation of the Cold War stalemate to a full-scale nuclear war and the deaths of tens to hundreds of millions of people. Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had indeed malfunctioned. |
While it is highly probable that if Petrov had reported this incident to his superiors they would have come to the same conclusion, it was a point in time when many people feared that the Cold War might become hot. Andropov, the new Soviet leader, was considered weak by the US president {{w|Ronald Reagan}}, and the Western countries were deploying new missile installation in Europe to counter existing missiles in the Eastern Bloc. This fear of nuclear war meant that at this time the {{w|Peace movement|peace movement}} in most western countries reached one of its highest levels. | While it is highly probable that if Petrov had reported this incident to his superiors they would have come to the same conclusion, it was a point in time when many people feared that the Cold War might become hot. Andropov, the new Soviet leader, was considered weak by the US president {{w|Ronald Reagan}}, and the Western countries were deploying new missile installation in Europe to counter existing missiles in the Eastern Bloc. This fear of nuclear war meant that at this time the {{w|Peace movement|peace movement}} in most western countries reached one of its highest levels. | ||
