Editing Talk:1505: Ontological Argument

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::I think the greatest fallacy is that they start with the conclusion that the fantasy that God exists isn't a fantasy, and then try to "reason" their way into finding support for that conclusion.  IOW, claiming to apply reason while working in exactly the opposite way that true reasoning demands.  I realize ontological arguments, as the explanation currently says, "seek to prove that God exists using only premises about the nature of existence and logical deductions from them. This is '''in contrast to arguments that are based on observations of the world'''".  But you don't get to reject the logical scientific method (marshal the facts and '''THEN''' draw conclusions from them) and then claim you're being logical. - Equinox [[Special:Contributions/199.27.128.120|199.27.128.120]] 15:15, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
 
::I think the greatest fallacy is that they start with the conclusion that the fantasy that God exists isn't a fantasy, and then try to "reason" their way into finding support for that conclusion.  IOW, claiming to apply reason while working in exactly the opposite way that true reasoning demands.  I realize ontological arguments, as the explanation currently says, "seek to prove that God exists using only premises about the nature of existence and logical deductions from them. This is '''in contrast to arguments that are based on observations of the world'''".  But you don't get to reject the logical scientific method (marshal the facts and '''THEN''' draw conclusions from them) and then claim you're being logical. - Equinox [[Special:Contributions/199.27.128.120|199.27.128.120]] 15:15, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
 
:::I'm not sure that checks out. While it's true that they are looking for proof of their belief rather than forming a belief, it's more like an experiment where you are looking for the cause of something you know about, at least from their perspective. It's a philosophical argument/thought experiment about religion, so they get away with some things that don't fly in science. No, the biggest flaw is the assumption that since we can conceive of it, it must exist. just because we can conceive of a perfect being, and it would be even greater if it existed, does not inherently mean it does. I can conceive of a world in which I do not exist, but that doesn't mean we are in that world, nor that such a world exists (ignoring anything to do with a multiverse). It's tautological at best, like saying, this thing would be true if it was true. it can also be thought of as "in order for a being to be perfect, it must exist, so such a being must exist so that it can be perfect," which is a little easier to wrap your head around.  I'm not saying there is no god, to be clear, I'm just saying that the ontological argument is not acceptable proof of that god's existence. [[User:Stardragon|Stardragon]] ([[User talk:Stardragon|talk]]) 23:50, 6 April 2022 (UTC)
 
  
 
::I find some humor in that 'A god who could find a flaw in the ontological argument' could easily be accomplished by a being who  met and/or exceeded the original premise of being 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Some of the more obvious logical flaws are pointed out in this thread, and proving the thought process wrong doesn't really affect its overall truthiness in either direction. [[Special:Contributions/108.162.221.133|108.162.221.133]] 07:22, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
 
::I find some humor in that 'A god who could find a flaw in the ontological argument' could easily be accomplished by a being who  met and/or exceeded the original premise of being 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Some of the more obvious logical flaws are pointed out in this thread, and proving the thought process wrong doesn't really affect its overall truthiness in either direction. [[Special:Contributions/108.162.221.133|108.162.221.133]] 07:22, 31 March 2015 (UTC)
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I noticed by pure coincidence that Megan and Cueball are posed exactly as they were in [[1315: Questions for God]]. Is that the only time they were posed like that while posing a theological question, or is this a broader pattern? I haven't found any others, offhand. Also noticed that the Ontological argument came up very subtly in [[1052: Every Major's Terrible]]. [[User:Jachra|Jachra]] ([[User talk:Jachra|talk]]) 21:31, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
 
I noticed by pure coincidence that Megan and Cueball are posed exactly as they were in [[1315: Questions for God]]. Is that the only time they were posed like that while posing a theological question, or is this a broader pattern? I haven't found any others, offhand. Also noticed that the Ontological argument came up very subtly in [[1052: Every Major's Terrible]]. [[User:Jachra|Jachra]] ([[User talk:Jachra|talk]]) 21:31, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
  
: [[1052: Every Major's Terrible]] does not reference the ontological argument. X therefore X exists is not the argument.{{unsigned|Atnorman}}
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: [[1052: Every Major's Terrible]] does not reference the ontological argument. X therefore X exists is not the argument.{{Atnorman|Atnorman}}
  
 
Yeah but that's a strawman fallacy. I win.
 
Yeah but that's a strawman fallacy. I win.
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There are some ontological arguments that actually work, though. Like Rule 34. Well, in most cases at least; I'm pretty sure there are some examples that fail the rule, but I don't want to check. --[[Special:Contributions/198.41.243.5|198.41.243.5]] 07:34, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
 
There are some ontological arguments that actually work, though. Like Rule 34. Well, in most cases at least; I'm pretty sure there are some examples that fail the rule, but I don't want to check. --[[Special:Contributions/198.41.243.5|198.41.243.5]] 07:34, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
 
Is a philosopher who assembles words into ("concieves") statements or questions that are inherently meaningless but appear meaningful greater than one who makes only meaningful ones? [[Special:Contributions/173.245.53.81|173.245.53.81]] 07:54, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
 
 
: Mu. [[Special:Contributions/172.68.11.53|172.68.11.53]] 15:53, 7 March 2017 (UTC)
 
 
Is it worth mentioning that an omnipresent God would, by definition, have eaten EVERY skateboard that was ever eaten, and even if that number is zero, would therefore be at worst tied for the world record?
 

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